16、Charlemagne
The euro is no cure-all
Apr 28th 2005 From The Economist print edition
French voters are right to fret about Euro-economics
HOW dare those materialistic French fret about unemployment and other bread-and-butter questions as they contemplate the lofty issues posed by the forthcoming referendum? That is what an irate Euro-establishment in Brussels is asking as it watches the Gallic debate. The electorate in France, Eurocrats complain, seems to be ignoring the topic in hand—and anyway, what have job losses to do with the Union’s defining document?
In fact, it is not unreasonable for the French and other Europeans to express their anger about the economy when voting on the constitution. For the last decade and more, the signature projects of the EU have been economic ones: in particular the launch of a single market in 1992, and a single currency in 1999. Each of these was sold on the basis of their economic benefits. And yet average unemployment in the 12 euro-area countries is almost 9% and growth is slow. It is not terribly surprising if politicians—seeking to promote the latest brilliant idea from Brussels—now get a fairly cool reception.
Criticism of the economic policies promoted by Brussels may be unsurprising—but is it fair? Economists reckon that the single market has increased growth, albeit by less than promised. And the euro has promoted trade and price transparency—as well as being a huge practical boon. But it is also true that many of the questions raised about the single currency before it was launched have yet to receive a satisfactory answer.
How would less productive economies cope with competition in the euro area when devaluation was no longer an option? Would a single interest rate for such different economies cause problems? Could Europe have a single currency without effective controls on national budgets? And is a monetary union ultimately sustainable without a political union to back it up?
The problems of the Italian economy raise the first question in an acute form. Since the single currency was born in 1999, Italian labour costs have risen by about 20% relative to Germany, because German firms have been much more effective at controlling wages and boosting productivity. While German exports have risen steadily, Italy’s are struggling—and the Italian economy is the slowest-growing of the big countries in the euro-area. If Italy had its own currency, devaluation would be a way to restore competitiveness, at least temporarily. But in a monetary union that is impossible. EU policymakers are worried.
In a speech last week at the Brussels Economic forum, Klaus Regling, the senior civil servant in the European Commission’s economic directorate, commented that Italy’s “loss of competitiveness does not bode well for the country’s economic prospects.” The audience waited for the soothingly optimistic balancing sentence that usually follows any such official comment—but it never came. Some EU economists argue that only a wrenching recession—involving bankruptcies and cuts in nominal wages—can now restore Italian competitiveness. And they point out that Italy is not the only country in the euro-area to have a growing problem with competitiveness. Spain, Portugal, Greece and even Ireland, that paradigm of European success, face similar challenges.
But if Italy is suffering a decline in its competitive position, why is Germany not booming? In his speech, Mr Regling hinted that this too might have something to do with inappropriate policies caused by the euro. Strong German exports, he observed, had been offset by stagnating domestic demand. He added: “Unavoidably in a monetary union, countries with below-average costs and prices experience relatively high…real interest rates.” Translation: when Germany needed lower interest rates to boost domestic demand, it did not get them because rates were set for the euro-area as a whole. Worse, Germany may now be stuck in a rut, because, as Mr Regling explained: “Low growth expectations…have become entrenched.”
A commission’s credibility
There is nothing the European Commission can do about the side-effects of a fixed exchange rate and a single interest rate for the euro area—they are inherent to a single currency. But when it comes to controlling budget deficits, the commission is determined to assert itself. Italy is again in the firing line. The commission intends to open an “excessive-deficit procedure” against the Italian (and Portuguese) authorities, for repeatedly breaching the 3% limit on government deficits set for EU countries. Eurocrats see their credibility is at stake. Both Germany and France evaded commission action, by insisting on a rewrite of the EU rules governing government deficits. Many analysts have concluded that the new rules are worthless. Senior figures at the European Central Bank say that it is critical to the future of the single currency that the EU shows it can still enforce budgetary discipline.
But it is far from clear that the commission will win its Italian test case. After seeing the French and Germans escape sanctions, the Italians may see little point in co-operating—all the more so since Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian prime minister, is desperate to push through tax cuts ahead of an election. The difficulty in enforcing budgetary discipline on national governments illustrates why some have always argued that monetary union needed to be followed by political union. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, a former French finance minister who played a crucial role in launching the euro, told last week’s Brussels forum that it should not assume that the creation of the single currency was irreversible. If Europe did not advance further towards political union, he argued, there would come a time when political tensions between EU members became so high that they threatened the future of the euro. Unfortunately for Mr Strauss-Kahn, his own country’s voters may soon be sending a message that makes life harder, putting it mildly, for political union’s keenest advocates. What then happens to monetary union may be the next big question those people must face.
16、NOTE：Charlemagne 查理曼大帝(742-814)时期为法兰克王, 800-814为西罗马帝国皇帝)是罗马帝国灭亡后西欧第一个帝国的创始人。寓意欧洲的再次复兴和统一，这在欧洲一体化进程中就可见一斑。
那些持唯物论的法国人考虑即将到来的公民投票引起的“崇高问题”时，怎么竟敢对失业和其他生计(面包黄油)问题忧心忡忡?这就是被激怒了的欧盟布鲁塞尔总部看到法国人的争论时所发出的疑问。欧盟官员抱怨说，法国选区好像忽略了正在讨论的问题—而且无论如何，失业与欧盟定义文件有什么关系?
事实上，对于法国人和其他欧洲人来说，在议会选举投票时表达对经济的怨气并非不合情理。在过去的十多年里，欧盟签署的方案都是经济方面的：尤其是1992年单一市场启动和1999年实行单一货币。每一个方案都以其经济利益为卖点。而且，欧元区12国平均失业率差不多达到9%，同时经济增长缓慢。如果政客们从布鲁塞尔(欧盟总部)寻求帮助、促进实现其最新精彩理念，如今得到相当冷漠的对待也并非很令人惊讶。
布鲁塞尔(欧盟总部)对经济政策提出批评意见可能不足为奇—然而这公平吗?经济学家们猜测，单一市场已经提高了经济增长，尽管比承诺的幅度要小。欧元也促进了贸易和价格透明度—这也同样是一个巨大而实用的福利。可是同样真实的是：单一货币在启动以前所引起的很多问题仍必须得到满意的答复。
当货币贬值不再可供选择，缺乏生产能力的经济如何才能应对欧元区的竞争?如此各异的经济体，却适用单一利率，会不会造成问题呢?在缺乏对各国国内预算有效控制的前提下，欧洲能否拥有单一货币?同时，如果没有政治同盟在背后支持，货币同盟能否最终得以确立?
意大利经济产生的麻烦使得第一个问题陷入严峻。由于德国企业在控制工资及推动生产能力方面已非常有效，自从1999年诞生了单一货币，意大利劳动力成本相对于德国陡增了大约20%。德国出口稳步增长的同时，意大利则步履维艰—意大利经济也是欧元区发展最慢的一个大国。如果意大利拥有其自主货币，那么贬值就是个恢复竞争力的方式，至少暂时可以。可是在一个货币同盟中，这是不可能的。欧盟的决策者们十分担忧。
欧盟经济理事会高级官员克劳斯·雷格林在上周欧盟布鲁塞尔经济论坛上的一次讲话中评论道：“意大利经济失去竞争力并非同时预示该国的经济前景就是如此。”听众们等待着这样的官方评论之后通常会出现的安慰性的乐观平衡的句子—不过这次却一直也没有出现。有些欧盟经济学家认为，现在只有一次痛苦的倒退—包括破产和名义工资削减—才能恢复意大利的经济竞争力。同样，他们还指出意大利并不是欧元区唯一遭受竞争力增长问题的国家。西班牙、葡萄牙、希腊、甚至欧洲成功的典范—爱尔兰，都面临类似的挑战。
然而如果意大利正在遭受竞争能力衰退问题，那么德国为什么并没有高速发展呢?瑞格林先生在讲话中暗示说，这也可能与欧元导致的不恰当的政策有些关系。他说，德国强劲的出口已被停滞不前的国内需求抵消了。他还补充道：“在一个货币同盟中不可避免地会出现这样的情形：平均消耗与价格较低的国家会经受相对较高的实际利率。”换句话说：当德国需要降低利率来刺激内需时，由于欧元区总体利率统一而无法实现。更糟糕的是，德国现在可能被一个惯例所困，按照瑞格林先生的解释，是由于“低增长预期…积习难改。”
欧盟委员会对于欧元区实行固定汇率和单一利率产生的副作用无能为力—各国都被单一货币粘在了一起。可是说到控制预算赤字，欧盟委员会坚决要自己维持。意大利又一次成了靶子。因为意大利再三突破了欧盟国家限定的3%的政府赤字限额，欧盟委员会打算启动一项“超额赤字程序”来应对意大利(和葡萄牙)当权者。欧洲共同市场认为其信誉度已危在旦夕。德国和法国强调应重新设定欧盟管理政府赤字的规则，两国都以此来规避欧盟委员会的制裁行动。很多分析人士得出结论：新规则毫无用处。欧洲央行权威人物说欧盟显示出其仍然能够加强预算管理对于欧洲单一货币的未来至关重要。
欧盟委员会是否会赢得这场意大利判例还远非清晰可见。在看到法德两国逃避制裁以后，意大利人可能很难有合作的迹象—而且由于意大利总理贝卢斯科尼正在不顾一切利用完成减税计划来谋求连任，各方面就更加显得如此了。推动各国政府预算管理制度上遇到的困难说明了为什么有人总是认为货币同盟必须是在政治同盟之后建立。法国前财政部长史特劳斯卡恩在启动欧元上起了决定性的作用;上周布鲁塞尔论坛上他说，不应该认为单一货币的建立是只进不退的。他认为，如果欧洲不能更进一步的形成政治同盟，那么欧盟成员国间政治上的紧张达到一定程度时，其对欧元未来的威胁总有一天会到来。对史特劳斯卡恩先生来说，不幸的是，其本国选民可能很快就会向建立政治同盟的最热情的鼓吹者们发出“会使生活困难、且放慢脚步”的讯息。之后货币同盟会遇到什么情形可能是这些人必须面对的下一个大问题。
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