一、英译汉
1、This paper examines the role of corporate governance in bank loan financing using all A – share publicly traded companies in China. Specifically, we investigate the effect of corporate governance on firm’ ability to raise bank loans and the cost of their bank loans. The results show that corporate governance has no significant effect on firms’ ability to raise either short – term bank loans or long – term bank loans. Firms’ ability to raise bank loans depends more on their financial performance. The cost of firms’ bank loans decreases with, among all corporate governance factors, the number of supervisors on the board and increases with ownership concentration. The evidence imp lies that corporate governance p lays a limited role in the decision of granting a loan by Chinese banks.
本文以中国深沪两市A股上市公司为样本,检验了公司治理在银行信贷决策中的作用。通过检验公司治理水平对企业银行借款融资能力和融资成本的影响,我们发现,企业银行借款融资能力方面,无论长期借款还是短期借款,公司治理因素对企业银行借款融资能力均没有影响,银行更看重企业的经营状况。企业银行借款融资成本方面,我们发现公司治理机制中只有监事会特征和股权集中度对企业银行借款融资成本有显著影响。具体地,监事会规模越大,融资成本越低;股权集中度越高,融资成本越高。本文结果说明公司治理因素在我国银行放贷决策中的作用有限。
2、Against the macroscopic ic backdrop of the financial crisis and the convergence of accounting internationally, this paper looks into the relationship between fair value and accounting conservatism, revolving around property rights protection. it is found through the research, that under the historical cost model, fair value and accounting conservatism are loosely linked; under fair value model, fair value and accounting conservatism are completely reversely connected; and under a mixed accounting model, fair value and accounting conservatism are in p roperalignment. In the financial crisis, the heated debate on fair value seems to be focused on“technical”issues of accounting; but in fact, it is revolved around the social aspect of accounting. Therefore the fair value has served as a jetton in the game of p roperty rights.
在金融危机和会计国际趋同的宏观背景下，以产权保护为逻辑主线，本文重点考察了公允价值与会计稳健性之间的关系。研究发现：在历史成本会计模式下，公允价值与会计稳健性之间若即若离；在公允价值会计模式下，公允价值与会计稳健性之间彻底悖离；在混合会计模式下，公允价值与会计稳健性之间适度耦合；金融危机中公允价值论战的焦点表面上是会计的“技术性”问题，实质上是会计的社会性”问题，即公允价值充当了一个产权博弈的筹码。
3、This paper, using the data of those listed firms that received unqualified audit opinions during 2004 to 2005 in the Chinese A-shares Market and measuring audit quality by the discretionary accruals calculated by the Cross- sectionals Jones Model investigates the relationship between audit committee characters and audit quality. We find that after controlling the influence of other variables ( such as auditor size, cash flow, earnings, year, whether the company is taking risk of delisting, whether the audit opinion includes emphasis), companies with audit committee got better audit quality than companies without audit committee. The older of the audit committee, the better of audit quality. Besides, the effect of audit committee in 2005 is better than 2004。
本文以中国2004年—2005年期间获得无保留审计意见的A股上市公司为研究样本,采用截面Jones模型估计出的公司操纵性应计利润(盈余管理)的绝对值作为审计质量的衡量指标,考察了审计委员会与审计质量之间的关系。研究发现,在控制了”会计师事务所规模”、”公司是否面临退市风险”、”审计意见是否带强调事项”、”公司经营活动现金流”、”公司盈余数量”、”年度”等指标后，设立审计委员会的公司的盈余管理绝对值显著比未设立审计委员会的公司小,这说明审计委员会能够显著的提高审计质量。进一步研究发现:审计委员会的成立时间越长,审计质量越高;审计委员会在2005年的作用比2004年更加显著。
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